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Abstract
In a life-cycle model with a bequest motive, we study the impact of smooth ambi-
guity aversion to uncertain survival probabilities on the optimal demand for annuities.
We implement a theory-driven laboratory experiment. First, a subjects ambiguity at-
titude is elicited in a simple experimental setting able to make the smooth ambiguity
model operational. Then, in a two-period annuity-bequest decision problem, the sub-
jects bequest in the second period is presented as a donation to a previously chosen
charity, contingent to the subject being active after the rst period. In line with the
theoretical predictions, we nd that ambiguity-averse (resp., loving) subjects invest
less (resp., more) in annuities than ambiguity-neutral ones. Furthermore, subjects
contingent donation to the chosen charity increases in their investment in annuities
only for su¢ ciently high levels of warm-glow altruism.
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1 Introduction
This paper contributes to the understanding of the determinants of a specic form of
self-insurance investment in annuities through a theory-driven laboratory experiment.
Annuities are nancial securities that help to deal with lifetime uncertainty and the
linked variation in savings. They are designed to be a reliable means of securing a steady
cash ow for individuals during their retirement years and to alleviate fears of longevity
risk, or outliving ones assets. More precisely, an annuity is a contract between an in-
dividual and an insurance company. The individual puts money in, essentially investing
through the insurance company. In exchange, the insurance company gives him the oppor-
tunity to annuitize that money, i.e., to receive guaranteed income payments for the rest
of his/her life. The annuity provides constant returns largely above those of bonds if
the bearer is alive, and no return otherwise. Therefore, this nancial product should be
particularly attractive for retirees who nd themselves increasingly exposed to longevity
risk, i.e., to the risk of being unable to sustain their consumption should they live longer
than average.
According to the life-cycle model of consumption with uncertain lifetime proposed by
Yaari (1965), agents who do not care for bequests should invest all their wealth in annuities.
Thus, full annuitization should be the optimal strategy followed by a rational individual
without altruistic motives (concerns for his/her spouse and children). Davido¤ et al.
(2005) have revisited Yaaris (1965) results in a simpler discrete-time setting and under a
somewhat more general asset structure. They show that positive annuitization still remains
optimal under very general specications and assumptions, including intergenerational
altruism and market frictions.
However, these theoretical predictions do not meet the facts. The predicted investment
of wealth at retirement in actuarially fair annuities of typical 65-year-old individuals is by
far higher than the actual demand for annuities, thereby leading to the so-called under-
annuitization puzzle. In fact, despite the retirement income benets that annuitization
provides, it has been and remains a relatively unpopular option. At the beginning of
this century, the private annuity markets in Australia, Canada, Chile, Israel, Singapore,
Switzerland, the UK and the US, was under-developed, especially relative to the life in-
surance market (see James & Song 2001).1 The situation has not much changed in the
last years, with elderly population showing a low willingness to invest in annuities even in
countries where this product is easily accessible.2
1Johnson et al. (2004) documented that in US dened-contribution savings plans, only 10% of partici-
pants who left their job after age 65 in 1992-2002 annuitized their assets. They estimated that in the same
period, among people at least 65 years old in the US, private annuities comprised just 1% of total wealth.
Inkmann et al. (2011) analyzed data from the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing, a biannual panel
survey among those aged 50 and over living in private households in England in 2002. They showed that
only 6% of the households in their sample received income from voluntary annuitization.
2Benartzi et al. (2011) analyzed more than 103,000 payout decisions from 112 di¤erent US dened-
benet pension plans during 2002-2008. About half of elder participants took their entire retirement benet
as a lump sum, even though the annuity was the default option and opting out required time-consuming
paperwork (see also Previtero 2014). In the UK, until 2014 the rules forced people to buy an annuity when
they retired. Since March 2015, about 4.2 million British savers over the age of 55 have more freedom
to manage their retirement pots. Customer research conducted shortly after the announcement indicated
that only one in three people aged 50 to 75 intended to buy a traditional annuity, and then only for a
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Several theoretical extensions have been provided so as to account for the under-
annuitization puzzle (see Brown et al., 2013, for a review). Although the literature to date
has failed to identify a su¢ ciently general explanation for consumersaversion to annuities,
it has nonetheless highlighted three factors that should be incorporated in life-cycle models
so as to mitigate the puzzle.
First, the bequest motive. Lockwood (2012) extends Davido¤ et al. (2005) in order to
also account for actuarially unfair annuities. He nds that a combination of realistic pricing
loads and moderate bequest motives can render annuities unattractive in an optimizing
model. His ndings are consistent with Yogo (2016), who needs a bequest motive to
generate low welfare gains from annuity market participation in a model with health
investments.
Second, an investment frame. Brown et al. (2008) propose that instead of evaluating
annuities within a consumption frame (focusing on the end result of what the bearer can
spend over time), one should adopt an investment frame (focusing on the intermediate
results of return and risk features when choosing assets). They provide survey evidence
that in an investment frame, individuals nd annuities quite unattractive, exhibiting high
risk without high returns, and thus prefer non-annuitized products. Their results are in line
with Hu & Scott (2007), which show how loss aversion (and other behavioral distortions)
can make annuities look undesirable: annuities are viewed as risky gambles where potential
losses loom larger than potential gains should the bearer die earlier than expected.
Third, uncertain survival probabilities. dAlbis & Thibault (2012, 2018) extends the
Yaaris (1965) framework by assuming that the individual does not know his/her survival
probability. They show that for an individual with maxmin expected utility à la Gilboa
& Schmeidler (1989) or with smooth ambiguity preferences à la Klibano¤ et al. (2005,
henceforth KMM) it is optimal not to annuitize but to purchase pure life insurance poli-
cies instead. Reichling & Smetters (2015) reach a similar conclusion through a di¤erent
extension of Yaari (1965): they allow a households mortality risk to be stochastic due to
health shocks. In this framework, lifetime annuity still helps to hedge longevity risk, but
the annuitys remaining present value is correlated with medical costs. They predict that
most households should not hold annuities, and many should hold negative amounts.
In this paper we consider together these three factors potentially explaining the under-
annuitization puzzle. We propose an experimental study of a two-period life-cycle model
with consumption and bequest similar to Davido¤ et al. (2005), and we assume, as in
Yaari (1965), no market imperfections and some warm-glow altruism. At period 1, an
individual decides how to share his income between bonds and actuarially-fair annuities
in an investment frame. He/she derives utility from a bequest that might happen at
the end of period 1 or period 2 and, upon survival, from consumption in period 2. As
discussed above, a bequest motive is necessary to obtain some partial annuitization but it
does not eliminate the advantage of annuities since they return more, in case of survival,
than regular bonds. As an additional factor of under-annuitization, we assume ambiguity
aversion toward uncertain survival probabilities, and we model this aversion with smooth
ambiguity preferences à la KMM, as in dAlbis & Thibault (2018).
portion of their assets. Koch et al. (2015) estimate that annuitiesshare of in-retirement products could
decline from the current 75% to about 30% to 40%.
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The assumption of Knightian uncertainty (i.e., ambiguity) on survival prob-
abilities receives strong empirical support.
It is natural that demand for annuities increases with life expectancy (see, e.g., em-
pirical results in Inkmann et al. 2011). However, despite all the available information
displayed in Life Tables, survival probabilities are nevertheless ambiguous to individuals,
due to at least three reasons: (i) a rather strong individual heterogeneity in the age at
death (see, e.g., the empirical analyses in Edwards & Tuljapurkar 2005, Bell & Miller
2005, and Benartzi et al. 2011); (ii) changes in the distribution of survival probabilities
at each age in the last century due to opposite factors such as medical progress versus the
emergence of new epidemic diseases (see, e.g., Cutler & Meara 2004); (iii) unreliable data
about last years of life, due to small number of observations and absence of a consensus
among demographers about the mean survival rate (see, in particular, Oeppen & Vaupel
2002).
The assumption of an aversion toward the ambiguity of survival probabilities
is also supported by a great deal of evidence. This does not only concern health issues
(see, e.g., Viscusi et al. 1991 about individuals aversion to ambiguous information on
the risk of lymphatic cancer). It is also detected in real case studies on environmental
risks (see Riddel & Shaw 2006 on the unwillingness to be exposed to the unknownrisks
associated with nuclear waste transportation). Furthermore, and more importantly for our
study, aversion to ambiguous survival probabilities has been somehow detected in portfolio
and life-cycle decisions: Post & Hanewald (2013) have shown that individuals are aware
of longevity risk and that this awareness a¤ects their savings decisions.
With all this in mind, the contribution of our study to the current debate on the
self-insurance role of investing in annuities is twofold. In a laboratory experiment, we
elicit ambiguity aversion and we show that if interpreted as aversion to ambiguous sur-
vival probabilities it is a good candidate to explain the empirically observed under-
annuitization puzzle. Furthermore, we analyze the interplay between this specic form
of self-insurance and voluntary bequests (upon survival), through a novel experimental
design where the next generation is a real charity receiving the subjects voluntary
bequests soon after the end of the experiment.
Subjects degree of ambiguity aversion is elicited in phase A of the experiment
through a simple mechanism able to make KMMs smooth ambiguity model operational.
Recall that, as in dAlbis & Thibault (2018), aversion to ambiguous survival probabilities
is introduced into the Yaaris (2005) annuity-bequest framework through a non-expected
utility model (KMM). Several experimental studies (e.g., Halevy 2007, Chakravarty &
Roy 2009, and Conte & Hey 2013) nd support for KMM in choice under uncertainty.
Here we rely on a simplied version of a mechanism in Attanasi et al. (2014), designed
ad hoc to experimentally identify KMM-coherent subjects. It consists in a combined
elicitation of two features of a subjects ambiguity attitude, namely the value-ambiguity
attitude and the choice-ambiguity attitude. This provides a robust test of the sign of the
ambiguity attitude that a subject discloses in the experiment. Subjects showing at the
same time value-ambiguity aversion (resp., proneness) and choice-ambiguity proneness
(resp., aversion) in phase A are not considered in the analysis of behavior in phase B.
This is because their behavior in phase A is incoherent with the predictions of KMM, our
reference model in phase B.
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In phase B of the experiment, we let subjects participate in the two-period annuity-
bequest decision problem discussed above (life-cycle framework). In the rst period, the
choice between annuities and bonds is proposed to subjects in an investment frame (in-
vestingmeans choosing annuities, not investingmeans choosing bonds). As discussed
above, in line with Brown et al. (2008), with such framing annuities should be unattrac-
tive to an ambiguity-neutral subject with low warm-glow altruism. The novelty of our
approach is in the way we measure warm-glow altruism and in the mechanism we use to
implement subjectsbequests to a next generation in the lab.
Bequests are presented as donations to a charity. Indeed, at the end of phase A, each
subject is asked to indicate through Web search a charity to which he/she would like to
donate part of the earnings he/she would eventually get in phase B. A short charity-related
questionnaire follows. Our auxiliary assumption is that answers to this questionnaire
provide a measure of the subjects utility from the act of giving to the charity in phase B.
Donations to the charities are implemented by the experimenter within 24 hours by the
end of the experiment, with each subject getting private E-mail conrmation of his/her
own donation.
This feature of the design has two main advantages. On the one side, it allows us
to create a tie between the donor and the bequests receiver, which it would not be the
case if the latter were a randomly matched subject in the lab. On the other side, it avoids
undesired e¤ects of post-experiment bequest sharing and unreliable measures of warm-glow
altruism if the receiver were a relative or a friend of the experimental participant.
After Andreonis (1989) model of warm-glow altruism, several experimental studies
have conrmed that warm glow is an important factor in monetary donations to a charity
(for a review, see Brown et al. 2013). In particular, Crumpler & Grossman (2008) show
that agents give some of their own money to charity even when their donation does not
alter the total amount donated to the charity. That is, individuals are giving for pure
warm-glow reasons, not to expand the amount available to the charity.
Some experiments have been run about how donorsbehavior extends to environments
with uncertain income. This literature is relevant for our experiment, since in phase B of
our design subjects choose the amount of the bequest in period 2 through the strategy
method, i.e., before the uncertainty about survivaland the income in period 2 is resolved.
In this regard, Kellner et al. (2015) have proved that it is cheaper to commit to donate
to a charity before the uncertainty is resolved, and so a larger donation is required to
maintain a positive image. This result is in line with Converse et al. (2012), who nd that
the combination of wanting an outcome and lack of control under uncertainty increases
donations to charity, and suggest that this is due to a belief that ones donations increase
the likelihood of the desirable outcome. For all these reasons, we should expect elicited
bequests in phase B of our experiment to be larger than theoretically predicted. However,
this e¤ect is compensated by the fact that in our annuity-charity decision problem, charities
receive a (involuntary) bequest also in the case of no survival in period 2, namely the
amount invested in bonds in period 1. Thus, the above-mentioned behavioral distortions
on the voluntary bequest in the favorable state of the world should be mitigated by the
possibility of an involuntary bequest in the unfavorable one.
Our experimental results conrm the theoretical prediction of a negative impact of
ambiguity aversion and a positive impact of ambiguity proneness on the demand for an-
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nuities. Indeed, in period 1, ambiguity-averse subjects invest signicantly less in annuities
than ambiguity-neutral ones, and ambiguity-loving subjects invest signicantly more than
the latter. Furthermore, warm-glow altruism and giving play no signicant e¤ect on the
demand for annuities.
In period 2, as assumed in our theoretical framework, we nd that the way the subject
shares his/her nancial wealth if active is independent from his/her ambiguity attitude. In
line with the theory, we observe that the amount the subject decides to keep for him/herself
is increasing in the annuities purchased in period 1. However, the subjectsbequest to
the chosen charity is non-decreasing in the investment in annuities. We nd it increasing
only for those subjects donating to charities which they perceive as closer in terms of
own participation and/or involvement, thereby experiencing a su¢ ciently high level of
warm-glow altruism through their voluntary donation.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes our experimental
design. Section 3 presents our behavioral predictions. Section 4 presents and discusses our
experimental results in light of the theoretical predictions. Section 5 concludes by framing
our contribution within the experimental literature of self-insurance decisions.
2 An experiment on annuities and charitable giving
2.1 The experimental protocol
Participants (60 male, 40 female) were 100 (67 undergraduate, 33 graduate) students of
University of Strasbourg, at the Laboratory of Experimental Economics of Strasbourg
(LEES). Students (70 in Economics, 7 in other social sciences, 9 in human sciences, and
14 in natural sciences) were recruited through ORSEE (Greiner 2015). Four sessions of
25 subjects each were conducted at the LEES. Each person could only participate in one
of these sessions. The experiment was programmed and implemented using the platform
www.econplay.org of the LEES.
Average earnings were e22.57, including an average transfer of e4.00 to a charity
chosen by each participant during the experiment, as it will be explained below. The
average duration of a session was 70 minutes, including instructions and payment.3
2.2 The experimental design
The experimental design is made of two phases (A and B), always implemented in the
same order. At the end of the experiment, subjects are paid for each phase. However,
instructions of phase B are given and read aloud only prior to that phase.
Phase A is made of tasks 1-4, presented in reverse order in half of the sessions (50 sub-
jects for each order). At the end of the experiment, only one of the four tasks is randomly
selected and actually performed, so as to determine earnings of phase A. Instructions of a
new task are given and read aloud only prior to that task.
Task 1 is a choice between a lottery with known probabilities and a battery of ten xed
amounts of money (see Figure 1). More precisely, each subject is given two options, Left
3The English translation of the instructions is provided as an electronic supplementary material of this
paper that can be found at www.giuseppeattanasi.wixsite.com/index/working-papers
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and Right. Option Left is a lottery L1 with two outcomes, e0 and e20, and 50% proba-
bility each 10-ball urn with 5 yellow balls and 5 blue balls i.e., L1 = (20; 0:5; 0; 0:5).4
Option Right gives instead a sure amount eXi, with Xi being an odd number with X1 = 1
and X10 = 19, and Xi < Xi+1 for each i = 1; :::; 9. Each subject is asked to indicate
whether he/she prefers Left or Right for each of the ten Xi. In particular, monotonicity
is exogenously imposed: each subject is asked to choose the lowest Xi for which he/she
prefers option Right to option Left.5 Call this choice X1, where 1 indicates task 1.
Subjects earnings in task 1 : If at the end of the experiment this task is randomly selected
for payment of phase A, the computer randomly draws one of the ten amounts Xi. If,
for this randomly drawn amount ~X1i , the subject has indicated that he/she prefers option
Left, i.e., ~X1i < X
1, then lottery L1 is played: one of the ten balls is randomly drawn by
the computer, and his/her earnings are e20 (e0) if the ball is yellow (blue). If for ~X1i the
subjects has indicated instead that he/she prefers option Right, i.e., ~X1i  X1, his/her
earnings are ~X1i .
Figure 1: Computer screen in task 1 (phase A)
Task 2 is the same as task 1, apart from the fact that here option Left is a lottery L2
with the same two outcomes as L1 but unknown probabilities, i.e., L2 = (20; p; 0; 1   p)
and p unknown. More precisely, subjects are told that 10-ball urn used for task 2 has
4Before the experiment starts, each subject is asked to choose one of two colors: yellow or blue. The
chosen color is the one that will be associated to the highest of the two outcomes for each lottery that
the subject would play in the experiment with an urn with yellow and blue balls. From now on, the
experimental design is explained under the assumption that the color chosen by the subject before the
beginning of the experiment is yellow. This is without loss of generality: the same rules of the decision
problem also hold if assuming that the chosen color is blue, and inverting yellowwith blue in what
follows.
5For a comparable study where monotonicity is imposed in a similar task, see Attanasi et al. (2018).
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an unknown composition of yellow and blue balls: p can take one of the eleven values in
f0; 0:1; :::; 0:9; 1g with any probability. In terms of Figure 1, option Left indicates an urn
with 10 grey balls, rather than 5 yellow balls and 5 blue balls.
Subjects earnings in task 2 : Similarly to task 1, the comparison between X2 the lowest
Xi for which the subject prefers option Right to option Left in task 2 and ~X2i  the com-
puters randomly selected amount in task 2 determines the subjects earnings. However,
if ~X2i < X
2, and so lottery L2 is played, the random draw of a ball by the computer is
made from an urn with unknown composition.
Task 3 is a choice between ten two-outcome lotteries L31; L
3
2; :::; L
3
10 with the same
probabilities and di¤erent outcomes (see Figure 2). Since the same 10-ball urn with 5
yellow balls and 5 blue balls of task 1 is used, all lotteries in task 3 are of the type
L3j = (xj ; 0:5;xj ; 0:5), with j = 1; 2; ::; 10 being the line index in Figure 2, xj = 10+ j and
xj = 10  j. Hence, all lotteries in the battery have the same mean (e10), with standard
deviation increasing with j, and L310, the last lottery of the battery (the one with greatest
standard deviation), being the same as L1 in task 1. Call j3 the chosen line and L3j the
chosen lottery in task 3.
Subjects earnings in task 3 : If at the end of the experiment this task is randomly selected
for payment of phase A, the computer randomly draws one of the ten balls of the urn
with known composition (5 yellow balls, 5 blue balls). The subjects chosen line j3 in task
3 determines the played lottery L3j : if the randomly drawn ball is yellow, the subjects
earnings are (10 + j3) euros; otherwise, his/her earnings are (10  j3) euros.
Figure 2. Computer screen of task 3 (phase A)
Task 4 is the same as task 3 (the ten lotteries L4j with j = 1; 2; :::10 have the same
two outcomes as L3j for each j). However, outcome probabilities are unknown, i.e., L
4
j =
(xj ; p;xj ; 1   p) and p unknown, as in task 2: subjects are told that 10-ball urn used for
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task 4 has an unknown composition of yellow and blue balls: p can take one of the eleven
values in f0; 0:1; :::; 0:9; 1g with any probability. In Figure 2, the urn is shown with 10
grey balls inside, rather than with 5 yellow balls and 5 blue balls.
Subjects earnings in task 4 : Di¤erently from task 3, the random draw of a ball by the
computer is made from an urn with unknown composition. As in task 3, the subjects
chosen line j4 determines the played lottery L4j .
At the end of phase A, none of the four tasks is actually performed. Subjects move
directly to phase B.
Phase B begins with each subject being asked to indicate a charity to which he/she
would like to donate part of the earnings he/she would get in the decision problem he/she
will participate in phase B.6 A short charity-related questionnaire follows. It is meant
to elicit the relation of the subject with the chosen charity7 and his/her perceptions of
othersand own altruism.8
Subjects face the choice of the charity and the related questionnaire before instruc-
tions of the decision problem they will participate in phase B are given. This is
an investment-donation two-period decision problem. In period 1 each subject is
given 10 euros and he/she has to decide how many of them to invest, where a 2 f0; 1; :::; 10g
is the invested amount and 10  a the amount not invested.
There are two possible outcomes in period 2 for the invested amount in period 1.
These two outcomes are determined through a 10-ball urn with unknown composition of
yellow and blue balls: subjects are told that this urn is of the same type of those used for
tasks 2 and 4 of phase A. If a yellow ball is randomly drawn at the beginning of period 2,
then in period 2 the invested amount is multiplied by 2 (2a). If a blue ball is randomly
drawn at the beginning of period 2, then in period 2 the invested amount is lost (0).
The random draw of a ball from the urn at the beginning of period 2 also determines
whether or not the subject is active in period 2.
If the drawn ball is yellow, then the subject is active in period 2: his/her total wealth
at the beginning of period 2 is given by the sum of the amount not invested and two times
the invested amount, i.e., (10   a) + 2a = 10 + a euros. Then, in period 2 the subject
chooses how much of this (10 + a) euros he/she wants to donate to the previously chosen
charity (x) and how much he/she wants to keep for him/herself (10 + a  x). Hence, x is
the voluntary donation to the charity, i.e. conditional to the subject being active in period
2.
If the drawn ball is blue, then the subject is not active in period 2 (there is no choice
the subject can make): the only amount that is not lost, i.e., the one not invested in
period 1, (10   a) euros, is directly donated to the previously chosen charity. This is
6Each subject is given 5 minutes to nd the website of the chosen charity and copy-paste it on the
screen of the experimental software.
7The four questionnaire items are: Since how many years you know this charity?; How many times
you have already donated to this charity?; Did you ever participate in the activities of this charity?;
Does any of your relatives or friends is directly concerned by this charity?.
8The two questionnaire items are, respectively: Would you say that most of the time people only care
about themselves or they try to help others?; Would you say that most of the time you only care about
yourself or you try to help others?. Possible answers to each question are on a scale from 0 (only care
about oneself) to 10 (help others).
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the involuntary donation to the charity, i.e., conditional to the subject not being active in
period 2.
To summarize, if a yellow ball is randomly drawn at the beginning of period 2, the
subjects earnings in phase B are (10 + a  x) and the donation to the charity is x, with
x being chosen by the (active) subject; otherwise, the subject earns nothing in phase B
and the donation to the charity is (10   a), with this donation not being chosen by the
(inactive) subject.
After the instructions of the investment-donation two-period decision problem have
bean read aloud by the experimenter, each subject is asked to go through two sets of
four control questions, aimed at stating his/her comprehension of the decision problem.
Each set of questions involves an example of (a; x) choice, and questions about the sub-
jects earnings and the voluntary/involuntary donation to the charity for each color of the
randomly-drawn ball.
Then, period 1 of the decision problem is performed: each subject chooses the invested
amount a. At the end of period 1, each subject chooses x, according to a meta-strategy
method : he/she indicates the amount of the voluntary donation to the charity before
knowing whether he/she will be actually active in period 2, i.e., before the random draw
of the ball from the unknown urn. Phase B ends with the random draw of the ball from
the unknown urn and the determination of subjects earnings from phase B and his/her
donation to the charity.
Finally, one of the four tasks of phase A is randomly selected and performed, thereby
determining subjects earnings from phase A.
The sum of earnings from phase A and from phase B is individually paid in cash to each
subject at the end of the experiment. Subjectsdonations to the charity are implemented
by the experimenter immediately after the end of the experiment, and donation receipts
sent to them within 24 hours after the end of the experiment. This last step of the design
can be interpreted as period 3 of phase B, where experimental subjects are no more active,
independently from their behavior and random events in periods 1 and 2.9
2.3 Comments on the experimental design
In this section we comment on some important features of the experimental design, and
provide motivations for specic design choices.
Ambiguity characterizes the decision problems in tasks 2 and 4 of phase A and in
period 1 of phase B. Phase A is meant to elicit a subjects value-ambiguity (tasks 1 and
2) and choice-ambiguity (tasks 3 and 4) attitudes within the smooth ambiguity model
of Klibano¤ et al. (2005), through a simpler and more direct version of the elicitation
method in Attanasi et al. (2014). Several design features of phase A deserve to be
discussed:
9More precisely, before participating in the decision problem of phase B, subjects are told that (quoting
the Instructions) Immediately after having privately paid all participantsearnings, the experimenter will
go through the charitys website indicated by each subject at the beginning of phase B, make the on-line
donation and ll in the donation screen with the identity of the donor; the email conrmation of the
electronic donation will be forwarded by the experimenter to the subject within 24 hours after the end of
the experiment, so as to account for possible delays due to, e.g., any charitieswebsite problems.
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 Order treatment. As in Halevy (2007), we also implement an order treatment. The goal
is to check whether subjectselicited ambiguity attitude is inuenced by either presenting
ambiguous tasks before unambiguous one task 2 (4) before task 1 (3) and/or presenting
choice-ambiguity related tasks (3 and 4) before value-ambiguity related tasks (1 and 2).
Notice that in Halevy (2007) only value-ambiguity attitude is elicited, while in Attanasi
et al. (2014), where both attitudes are elicited, such order treatment is not implemented.
 Subjects choice of the winning color. An important issue raised in the experimental
literature about Ellsberg-type tasks is subjectsthinking about strategic behavior and/or
manipulations by the experimenter (see Schneeweiss 1973, Kadane 1992). To prevent
the possibility that subjects might suspect they can be tricked on computer-generated
realizations of random processes, at the beginning of the experiment we let each subject
choose one of two colors (yellow or blue). The chosen color is associated to the highest
of the two outcomes for each lottery that the subject would play in the experiment with
a computerized urn with yellow and blue balls. This urn and the computer-generated
realization are the same for all subjects conditional on the randomly selected task of
phase A and on period 1 of phase B. The fact that the chosen winningcolor is not the
same for all subjects prevents the possibility of strategic manipulations of the computer-
generated realization by the experimenter.
 Instructions distributed prior to each task. Although subjects are told that phase A
is made of four tasks, as in Halevy (2007) and Attanasi et al. (2014) instructions of a
new task are given and read aloud only prior to that task. This minimizes across-task
contamination in phase A.
 Random draws performed at the end of the experiment. At the end of phase A, subjects
know nothing about the composition of the unknown urns of tasks 2 and 4. This prevents
subjects from making any updating about the actual composition of the unknown urn of
phase B. Moreover, such updating would be meaningless, since although all characterized
by the same level of ambiguity the three urns used for task 2 of phase A, for task 4 of
phase A, and for phase B are not the same urn. This design feature minimizes across-task
and across-phase hedging behavior against ambiguity (see, e.g., Bade 2015).
Phase B is meant to elicit subjectsbehavior in a life-cycle framework à la Davido¤ et
al. (2005), where the annuity vs. bond decision is taken in period 1, and voluntary bequests
are chosen in period 2 and implemented in period 3 (after the end of the experiment).
Several design issues of phase B deserve to be discussed:
 Simpler decision problem. In the experiment, the labels annuityand bondare never
used in the instructions, so as to avoid framing e¤ects. We use the more neutral wording
invested amountand amount not invested, respectively. This, coupled with a return
on bonds set equal to 1 in the experiment, allows us to present the subjects with a simple
investment problem where the invested amount a is the demand for annuities and the
amount not invested (10   a) is the demand for bonds. The fact that the demand for
bonds is a pure transfer of the initial endowment from period 1 to period 2 is without loss
of generality, given that in the general version of the annuity-bond trade-o¤ problem, the
return on bonds is independent of whether the subject is alive(active) or not in period 2
(see dAlbis & Thibault 2018). Furthermore, the experimental implementation of the three
periods of phase B is in line with the return on bonds being set equal to 1. In fact, the time
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lag between period 1 and period 2 is very short (period 2 starts immediately after the end of
period 1). Same is for period 2 and period 3 (bequest implementation): the experimenter
implements the subjects bequest immediately after the end of the experiment, and the
bequest receipt is sent to the subject within 24 hours (same short time lag between bequest
decision and bequest implementation for all subjects in the experiment).
 Bequests as charity donations. In a life-cycle framework à la Davido¤ et al. (2005)
see Section 3 , both voluntary and involuntary bequests are intended as money that the
subject gives to the next generation. In particular, the subjects voluntary bequest x is the
money given if alivein period 2, and the involuntary bequest (10  a) is the money left
if not alive in period 2. Given our interest in understanding whether intergenerational
altruism plays a role in annuitization, we tried to relate the bequests receiver (outside
the experiment) to the donor (in the experiment). We decided not to involve a subjects
relative or friend as bequest receiver, mainly for two reasons: rst, it would not have been
possible to check ex-post the exact sharing of the subjects bequest between his/her relative
or friend and him/herself; second, measuring the subjects altruism toward a relative or
friend would have lead to similarly high levels of elicited altruism in the subject pool, with
no heterogeneity in the distribution of this idiosyncratic feature. Rather, we let subjects
in the experiment indicate before knowing the decision problem in phase B a charity as
bequest recipient. The fact that the subjects bequest is implemented immediately after
the experiment by the experimenter (who provides the subject with the charity donation
receipt) guarantee ex-post check of bequest implementation. Finally, the charity-related
questionnaire allows us to measure, among other things, the subjects links with the chosen
charity and thereby his/her level of warm-glow altruism toward it.
 Meta-strategy method for voluntary bequest elicitation. In a life-cycle framework à la
Davido¤ et al. (2005), the voluntary bequest choice x should be made in period 2, and
only if the subject is alive, i.e., active, in period 2. However, following a widely-used
method in experimental economics, in the experiment each subject is asked to choose x
before period 2. This allows us to elicit x also for those subjects who will not be active in
period 2, due to an unfavorable random draw at the end of period 1.10
 Control questions. The two sets of four control questions about the decision problem
in phase B are aimed at identifying subjects for whom we are sure that they have not
perfectly understood the rules and/or the structure of payo¤s of the decision problem
in phase B. We include in this group all subjects that have made at least 1 mistake in
the rst set and at least 1 mistake in the second set of 4 control questions.11 Although
these subjects are allowed to participate in the investment-donation two-period decision
problem, we do not consider them in the data analysis of phase B (Section 4.4).
Finally, our payment protocol deserves some comments:
 Random-lottery incentive mechanism and accumulated earnings. In phase A, only one of
10Notice that, in terms of Yaaris (1965) and Davido¤ et al. (2005), (10 + a   x) is the subjects
consumption if alive in period 2. However, the labels bequest, consumptionand aliveare never used
in the instructions, again to avoid framing e¤ects. We use the more natural wording amount donated to
the charity for x, amount kept by the subject for (10 + a  x), and activerather than alive.
11 If a subject has made no mistake in the rst set of four control questions, he/she is allowed to skip the
second set of questions.
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the four tasks is randomly selected at the end of the experiment to determine participants
earnings in that phase. Here we adopt a random-lottery incentive mechanism extensively
used in economic experiments (see the survey in Cox et al. 2015) with the twofold goal
of obtaining no wealth e¤ect between di¤erent decision tasks of phase A, and proposing
bigger stakes to experimental subjects. Furthermore, in order to let subjects focus sepa-
rately on each phase of the experiment, we paid earnings of both phase A and phase B.
This accumulated payo¤ is nally assigned according to two independent random draws.
This payment protocol should have minimized potential distortions linked to the random-
lottery incentive mechanism in phase A, in line with recent ndings in the experimental
literature (Cox et al. 2015).
 Phase A proposed before but paid after phase B. We propose to subjects phase A al-
ways before phase B, so as to avoid investment decision and more importantly bequest
decision in phase B being distorted by weird expectations about what will happen in sub-
sequent phase A. However, we pay phase A always after subjects go through phase B, so
as to avoid wealth e¤ects (e.g., heterogeneity of previously collected earnings) on behavior
in phase B.
 Same expected earnings in both phases. We set payo¤s in each of the four decision tasks
in phase A such that the ex-ante (i.e., before making the decision) expected value of a
subjects earnings in phase A is equal to the ex-ante expected value of his/her earnings in
phase B. In fact, the subjects ambiguity attitude in phase A is elicited for the same inter-
val of lottery outcomes of the decision problem he/she faces in phase B. More precisely,
the ten lines of task 4 of phase A (see the three central columns of Figure 2) represent the
ten possible pairs of outcomes (10+a; 10 a) for each positive annuitization in period 1 of
phase B (a 2 f1; 2; :::; 10g). This allows us to test whether a di¤erent behavior in period
1 of phase B compared to task 4 of phase A is due to a positive bequest x in the former,
which reduces the two lottery outcomes to (10 + a   x; 0) for the subject and increases
them to (x; 10  a) for the charity he/she has previously indicated.
3 Behavioral Predictions
In this section, rst we show how the four tasks of phase A can be used to detect the sign
of a subjects ambiguity attitude within the KMM model. Then, we derive behavioral
predictions for phase B in terms of the impact of a subjects ambiguity attitude on his/her
optimal investment in annuities, and of the latter on his/her warm-glowoptimal charity
donation.
3.1 Phase A: Ambiguity Attitude
We discuss the link between the four tasks of phase A and our operational denition of
ambiguity aversion, which relies on Attanasi et al. (2014).
In Section 2.2 we called Xt the lowest sure amount for which a subject prefers option
Right to option Left in task t 2 f1; 2g (see Figure 1). This Left-to-Right switching amount
determines an interval estimate for the certainty equivalent of lottery Lt in task t 2 f1; 2g:
the greater Xt, the higher his/her estimated certainty equivalent. With this in mind, the
following denition can be introduced.
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Denition 1 (value-ambiguity attitude)
A value-ambiguity-averse subject values an ambiguous lottery less than its unambiguous
equivalent with the same mean probabilities. Then, this subject shows value-ambiguity aver-
sion if X2  X1, value-ambiguity neutrality if X2 = X1, and value-ambiguity proneness
if X2  X1.
In Section 2.2 we also called jt the subjects chosen line in task t 2 f3; 4g (see Figure 2).
The chosen line determines the outcome spread of the lottery Ltj played in task t 2 f3; 4g:
the greater the index jt (jt = 1; :::; 10 for each t), the greater the outcome spread of Ltjt .
With this in mind, the following denition can be introduced.
Denition 2 (choice-ambiguity attitude)
A choice-ambiguity-averse subject chooses a less-risky lottery when the probability distri-
bution over lottery outcomes is ambiguous (unknown probabilities). Then, this subject
shows choice-ambiguity aversion if j4  j3, choice-ambiguity neutrality if j4 = j3, and
choice-ambiguity proneness if j4  j3.
In the KMM framework, smooth ambiguity aversionis shown to be equivalent to the
concavity of the von Neumann-Morgenstern index function  accounting for the attitude
toward mean-preserving spreads in the induced distribution of the expected utility of
the one-stage lottery conditional to the in our experiment, 11 possible compositions
of the unknown lottery. Gollier (2014) has shown that it is not true in general that
the concavity of the  function (value-ambiguity aversion) implies the choice-ambiguity-
aversion of the subject. In other words, a value-ambiguity-averse subject could choose a
lottery with greater outcome spread when probabilities are unknown (task 4) than when
they are known (task 3). However, Gollier (2014) provides su¢ cient conditions on the
structure of the two-stage uncertainty to re-establish the link between the concavity of
 and ambiguity aversion. One of these su¢ cient conditions is that the di¤erent second-
stage distributions of the lottery outcomes can be ordered by the Monotone Likelihood
Ratio stochastic order. Indeed, this su¢ cient condition is satised by the second-stage
distributions of lottery outcomes in tasks 1-4 of phase A (and in the decision problem of
period 1 of phase B). Hence, we conclude that, in the smooth ambiguity framework, the
two operational denitions of value-ambiguity attitude and choice-ambiguity attitude are
equivalent in our experiment, and are satised if  is concave. This justies the following
denition.
Denition 3 (coherent-ambiguity attitude)
A subject is coherent-ambiguity-averse if X2  X1 and j4  j3, with at least one of the two
relations holding strictly; coherent-ambiguity-neutral if X2 = X1 and j4 = j3; coherent-
ambiguity-loving if X2  X1 and j4  j3, with at least one of the two inequalities holding
strictly.
Therefore, our operational denition of coherent-ambiguity attitude in the smooth
ambiguity framework is based on a double-check: we compare subjects decisions in task
1 vs. task 2 and in task 3 vs. task 4. The rst comparison tells us whether, given the
two second-stage lottery-outcomes, he/she prefers to know rst-order probability p than
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facing a mean-preserving spread of second-order probabilities over the all possible discrete
probabilities ep 2 f0; 0:1; :::; 0:9; 1g. The second comparison tells us whether he/she prefers
a less risky lottery where this mean-preserving spread takes place. An ambiguity-averse
subject should show both these preferences. Therefore, in Section 4.4 (test of behavioral
hypotheses) subjects showing at the same time value-ambiguity aversion (resp., proneness)
and choice-ambiguity proneness (resp., aversion) in phase A are not considered in the
analysis of behavior in phase B.
3.2 Phase B: Annuitization and Bequest
This section relies on the theoretical model of dAlbis & Thibault (2018) to obtain behav-
ioral predictions for phase B. This model introduces the rationale for ambiguity proposed
by KMM into a static model of consumption and bequest under uncertain lifetime similar
to Yaari (1965) and Davido¤ et al. (2005).
The length of life of the Decision Maker (DM, hereafter) is at most two periods, with
death being uncertain at the end of period 1 and certain at the end of period 2. At period
1, the DM is endowed with an initial wealth w that can be shared between annuities a
and bonds w   a.
In exchange for each unit of the initial wealth, bonds return R > 0 units of consumption
in period 2, whether the DM is alive or not at the end of period 1; if the DM is not
alive, the investment in bonds directly goes to the next generation, thereby generating an
involuntary bequest at the end of period 1.
Conversely, annuities return Ra  R in period 2 if the DM is alive and nothing if
he/she is not alive. Negative annuitization is not allowed (a  0). If alive in period 2, the
DM may allocate his/her wealth between consumption c and voluntary bequest x to the
next generation. Since death is certain at the end of period 2, the latter is a voluntary
bequest.
In the experiment we set the exogenous parameters of the problem such that the initial
wealth w = 10 euros, the annuities return Ra = 2, and the bonds return R = 1. Thus, the
DMs budget constraint in period 2 writes:
c = Raa+R(w   a)  x = 2a+ 1  (10  a)  x = 10 + a  x (1)
with c  0; x  0; 0  a  10.
The DM derives utility from the involuntary bequest at the end of period 1 and, upon
survival, from consumption in period 2. Following Davido¤ et al. (2005), dAlbis &
Thibault (2018) assume that whatever the length of the DMs life, bequests are received
in period 3, involving additional return. Therefore, the voluntary bequest is xR, if the DM
is alive in period 2; the involuntary bequest is (10 a)R2; if he/she is not alive in period 2.
The parametrization R = 1 makes the actual value of voluntary and involuntary bequests,
respectively x and (10  a), independent from the period (2 or 3) they are received by the
next generation.
The state-dependent DMs utility is u(c; x) if alive in period 2 and v(10 a) if he/she is
not alive. DMs utility if not alive (function v) measures his/her warm-glow giving to the
next generation. However, in line with the literature on the economic valuation of risks to
health and life (see, e.g., Viscusi & Aldy 2003), we assume that the DMs utility is larger
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if he/she is alive (consumption and voluntary bequest) than if he/she is not (involuntary
bequest). A separable utility if alive, u(c; x) = h(c)+m(x), as in Yaari (1965) and Davido¤
et al. (2005), by construction satises all the above assumptions.
The DMs survival probabilities are uncertain in period 1. More precisely, the DM
does not know his/her own probability distribution but only knows the set of possible
distributions. We assume that there exist states of nature associated with given survival
probabilities that may be interpreted as health types, to which the DM subjectively as-
sociates a probability to be in. Hence, following KMM, we can model the lottery with
unknown (survival) probabilities through second-order priors over rst-order probability
distributions. Let us denote the random (discrete) survival probability by ep whose sup-
port is denoted Supp(ep), and the DMs evaluation of the survival expectancy by E(ep) = p.
Given that p = 1=2 by construction in tasks 1 and 3 of phase A, and assuming that the
principle of insu¢ cient reason holds, the subject has symmetric beliefs on the composi-
tion of the unknown urn of period 1. Hence, E(ep) = 1=2 in our implementation, and,
as in Yaari (1965), we have annuities available for purchase that are actuarially fair, i.e.,
Ra = R=p = 2.
The DMs state-dependent expected utility, denoted U(a; x; ep), is thus also a random
variable that writes:
U(a; x; ep) = ep  [h(10 + a  x) +m(x)] + (1  ep)  v(10  a): (2)
We also assume that the DM has smooth ambiguity preferences à la KMM: ambiguity
attitude is introduced using function , whose concavity/linearity/convexity has been
elicited in phase A. The utility function of the DM is then given by an expectation of
an expectation. The inner expectations evaluate the expected utilities corresponding to
possible rst-order probabilities while the outer expectation aggregates a transform of
these expected utilities with respect to the second-order prior. The utility function writes:
 1(E((U(a; x; ep)))): (3)
A concave (resp., convex)  implies ambiguity aversion (resp., ambiguity proneness), while
a linear  identies an ambiguity-neutral DM (subjective expected-utility maximizer).
The DM faces the following problem, denoted (P):
max
a;x
 1(E((U(a; x; ep))))
s:t: U(a; x; ep) = ep  [h(10 + a  x) +m(x)] + (1  ep)  v(10  a):
Then, the solution (a?; x?) of (P) satises the FOCs:
E(0(U(a?; x?; ep))  [ep  h0(10 + a?   x?)  (1  ep)  v0(10  a?)] = 0; (4)
 h0(10 + a?   x?) +m0(x?) = 0: (5)
Equation (4) remarks that the survival probability a¤ects the DMs optimal demand
for annuities in period 1. This probability is not objectively known, i.e., it is ambiguous.
Ambiguity aversion determines the optimal exposure to uncertainty. A more ambiguity-
averse DM chooses to be less exposed, which means that he/she aims at smoothing the
expected utilities computed in each state of nature.
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To explain this e¤ect, let us consider a simple example with two states of nature, 1
and 2, for which the survival probabilities are respectively p1 and p2. Using equation (2),
the optimal di¤erence of expected utilities in both states is thus:
(p1   p2) f[h(10 + a?   x?) +m(x?)]  v (10  a?)g ; (6)
which is proportional to the optimal di¤erence between the utility if the DM lives for two
periods and the utility if he/she lives for one period only. As the utility depends on the
bequest, the sign of the latter di¤erence is not a priori given. However, following dAlbis
& Thibault (2018) it can be easily proven that the latter di¤erence is always positive and
that reducing the demand for annuities reduces the di¤erence (6).
The intuition is that, upon survival, the utility increases with the share of annuities in
the portfolio. As a consequence, to reduce the exposure to life uncertainty, an ambiguity-
averse DM has to increase his/her demand for bonds in our experiment, the amount
not invested, (1   a) , and reduce his/her demand for annuities in our experiment,
the invested amount a. Conversely, an ambiguity-loving DM would prefer to increase the
exposure to life uncertainty, by increasing the di¤erence (6). This would lead to reduce
(1  a) and increase a.
Based on this reasoning, we elaborate our rst, and most important, behavioral hy-
pothesis. It concerns period 1 of phase B of our experiment:
Hypothesis 1 [Ambiguity over Annuity in period 1 ]. The invested amount a
in period 1 of phase B is signicantly lower (resp., higher) for an ambiguity-averse (resp.,
ambiguity-loving) subject than for an ambiguity-neutral subject.
Hypothesis 1 essentially relies on equation (4), showing that the (unknown) survival
probability a¤ects the optimal demand for annuities in period 1. At the same time,
equation (5) shows that, upon survival in period 2, the DMs optimal allocation of the
nancial wealth between consumption and bequest is not a¤ected by this probability.
Indeed, in the life-cycle decision problem of phase B, ambiguity attitude is only e¤ective in
period 1: having uncertainty been resolved between period 1 and period 2, the survived
DM should not rely on his/her ambiguity attitude when choosing how to distribute his/her
total wealth (10  a) among voluntary bequest x and his/her consumption (10  a  x) in
period 2.
Based on this simple intuition, a second behavioral hypothesis, about period 2 of phase
B of our experiment, can be elaborated:
Hypothesis 2 [Ambiguity over Wealth Allocation in period 2 ] Conditional on
the ball of the winning color being randomly drawn at the end of period 1, in period 2
the following occurs: the share of wealth if active used for the voluntary donation, i.e.,
x=(10  a), and the complementary share kept by the subject as his/own private earning
in phase B, i.e., (10  a x)=(10  a), do not depend on the subjects ambiguity attitude.
Finally, equation (5) can be also used to dene the application x? = f(a?), which
satises 0  f 0(a)  1. Hence, at the optimum, if the DM survives, his/her consumption
10 + a   f(a) and his/her bequest f(a) increase with the demand for annuities. The
latter increase depends on the DMs warm-glow altruism. Therefore, a third behavioral
hypothesis can be introduced:
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Hypothesis 3 [Annuity over Consumption and Bequest in period 2 ] Condi-
tional on the ball of the winning color being randomly drawn at the end of period 1, in
period 2 the following occurs: both the voluntary donation x and the amount kept by the
subject as his/own private earning in phase B, (10   a   x), are signicantly higher for
higher invested amounts in period 1.
In Section 4.3 we will show how the subjects declared links to the chosen charity
are crucial features for us to detect his/her actual warm-glow altruism from voluntary
donation to this charity. In fact, while the rst part of hypothesis 3 (positive relation
between annuity returns and period 2 consumption) also holds for selsh subjects, the
second part (positive relation between annuity returns and period 2 bequest) only holds
see eq. (5) for a su¢ ciently high level of warm-glow altruism m() involved by the
voluntary donation x. Indeed, warm-glow altruism should be strong enough to o¤set the
subjects utility h(10 + a   x) from keeping the higher return generated in period 2 (if
alive) by the investment in annuities he/she made in period 1.
4 Data analysis
In this section, rst we report the distribution of subjects according to the elicited sign of
ambiguity attitude in phase A. Then, we report raw statistics on the chosen charity and
on answers to the charity-related questionnaire before phase B. Finally, we test the three
behavioral hypotheses about phase B, elaborated in the previous section.
4.1 Elicited ambiguity attitudes in phase A
Figure 3 reports the distribution of elicited ambiguity attitudes of the 100 subjects ac-
cording to their behavior in phase A. The left panel reports value-ambiguity attitudes (see
Section 3.1, Denition 1: task 2 vs. task 1), the central panel reports choice-ambiguity
attitudes (Denition 2: task 4 vs. task 3), the right panel reports coherent-ambiguity
attitudes (Denition 3: coherence of denitions 1 and 2).
Figure 3. Distributions of value-ambiguity, choice-ambiguity, and coherent-ambiguity attitudes.
In line with the results of Attanasi et al. (2014), the majority of the subjects (around
4/10) are ambiguity-averse, and only few of them (2/10) are ambiguity-loving, indepen-
dently of the dimension (value or choice). Furthermore, again in line with the previous
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study, we nd that around half of the subjects show ambiguity aversion in at least one
dimension (value or choice) and no ambiguity proneness in the other dimension. These
subjects are coherent-ambiguity-averse. Consistently, around 2/10 subjects are coherent-
ambiguity-loving (ambiguity-averse in at least one dimension and ambiguity non-averse in
the other dimension). Only 16/100 subjects show neutrality to ambiguity in both dimen-
sions. We nd no signicant treatment e¤ect (reserve order of presentation of the four
tasks) in the three distributions of Figure 3 (2 test: p-value = 0.798 for value-ambiguity
attitude, 0.606 for choice-ambiguity attitude, 0.320 for coherent-ambiguity attitude).
We see the fact that our results are in line with those in Attanasi et al. (2014) as a
rst small methodological contribution of our paper, since our 4-task phase A is a much
simpler version of their elicitation method of ambiguity attitude within KMM.
In the analysis of behavior in phase B, we do not consider the 17 unclassied subjects
in the right panel of Figure 3 (7/50 in the control treatment, 10/50 when tasks 1-4 are
presented in reverse order): these subjects show ambiguity aversion in one dimension and
ambiguity proneness in the other one. Therefore, they did not pass our check of coherency
of behavior within the smooth ambiguity framework of KMM. We call KMM-coherent
the 83/100 subjects who passed the 4-task coherency test of phase A.
4.2 Identication of rationalsubjects in phase B
Figure 4 reports the distribution of subjects according to the number of incorrect answers
in the two sets of 4 control questions administered at the beginning of phase B. Those
questions concerned the rules and/or the structure of payo¤s of the decision problem of
phase B. The 27/100 subjects who made no mistake in the rst set of four control questions
were allowed to skip the second set of questions. Among the remaining 73 subjects, only 7
made at least one mistake in the second set of control questions. As anticipated in Section
2.3, throughout this section we do not consider these 7 subjects, since for them we are not
sure that they perfectly understood the decision problem of phase B.
Figure 4. Distribution of incorrect answers in the two sets of control questions (about phase B).
Considering together this group of 7 subjects and the group of 17 unclassied subjects
in Figure 3, we get 22 subjects who showed either bounded rationality at the beginning
of phase B and/or a non-KMM rationalizable behavior in phase A (2 subjects belonged
to both groups). Therefore, when testing our behavioral hypotheses in Section 4.4, we
only consider the 78/100 subjects who showed full comprehension of the annuity-bequest
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problem of phase B and a behavior in phase A coherent with ambiguity attitude within
KMM (i.e., our reference model of subjectsambiguity attitude in phase B). From now
on, we call these subjects rational-KMM-coherent.
4.3 Charities and measures of warm-glow altruism
Figure 5 reports the distribution of chosen charities at the beginning of phase B. 55/100
subjects chose a well-known international charity (red color) and 40/100 a national charity
(yellow color).12 Only 5/100 chose a local charity (light yellow color), i.e., operating in a
specic region of France.13
We see this as a second methodological contribution of our study: the combined imple-
mentation of these three features (i) charity chosen by the subject through a 5-minute
web search; (ii) charity donation implemented by the experimenter through the charitys
Website immediately after the experiment; (iii) E-mail conrmation of the donation in-
dividually sent by the experimenter to the subject within 24 hours by the end of the
experiment induced the subjects to choose well-known and reliable charities, o¤ering an
e¢ cient and transparent Website donation system. This also reduced the heterogeneity of
subjectschoices in terms of next generationas recipient of their donations in phase B.
Figure 5. Distribution of subjectschosen charities before the beginning of phase B.
Table 1 reports the distribution of answers to a short questionnaire administered after
the choice of the charity. This questionnaire contained four items specic to the previously
chosen charity, two items on the general perception of othersand own altruism, and items
12Of these, 47 are French charities, one is in Burkina Faso (Association African Solidarité), one is in
Italy (Caritas), and another one in Romania (Pretuieste Viata).
13The ve local (French) charities are: Association Les Disciples (Strasbourg), Virade de lEspoir (Mor-
bihan), Association de lEspérance des Nécessiteux en lAmélioration du Futur (Strasbourg), De lEau pour
lAfrique (Grenoble), La Main du Coeur - Aide aux Enfants (Strasbourg).
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related to subjects idiosyncratic features. Average values of these variables are shown
in Table 1 across the two types of chosen charities of Figure 5: international (55, red
color), and national or local (45, yellow color). The last column reports the results of a
Mann-Whitney equality-of-populations rank test (adjusted for ties). In square brackets, we
report the same statistics and results of tests concerning the subgroup of 78 rational-KMM-
coherent subjects on whom the analysis in Section 4.4 will rely. We add this information in
order to show that, besides having selected the same proportion of international, national
and local chosen charities resp., 55.1% (43/78), 39.7% (31/78), and 5.1% (4/78) , our
target group presents a distribution of answers to the questionnaire similar to the one of
the whole sample of 100 subjects. Therefore, we claim that our theory-driven selection
of the target group of subjects did not distort the charity-related measurement of warm-
glow altruism, and did not generate any bias in the distribution of elicited idiosyncratic
features.
The four variables measuring subjects warm glow specic to the chosen charity in-
dicates, respectively: the number of years the subject knew the chosen charity (Charity
Know Years); how many times he/she previously donated to this charity (Charity No.
Previous Donations); whether he/she ever participated in this charitys activities (Charity
Participation dummy); whether any of his/her relatives or friends was directly concerned
by this charity (Charity Relatives-Friends dummy). The two variables measuring the sub-
jects general perception of others and own altruism take values from 0 to 10, according
to their agreement with the statement that most of the time people try (resp., he/she
tries) to help others rather than caring about themselves (resp., him/herself). Reported
idiosyncratic features are gender (0 for male, 1 for female), age (categories 1-4: 18-19,
20-25, 26-30, 30-35 years old), graduate student dummy, economics student dummy.
Charity-specic, altruistic Chosen Charity Mann-Whitney test
and idiosyncratic variables International National/Local p-value
Charity Know Years 3.27 [3.21] 3.10 [3.00] 0.510 [0.448]
Charity No. Previous Donations 0.69 [0.60] 0.89 [0.97] 0.438 [0.362]
Charity Participation 0.18 [0.16] 0.33 [0.34] 0.083 [0.067]
Charity Relatives-Friends 0.16 [0.12] 0.31 [0.29] 0.083 [0.061]
Altruism Others 4.44 [4.28] 4.51 [4.49] 0.944 [0.760]
Altruism Own 5.91 [5.68] 6.16 [6.06] 0.348 [0.313]
Female 0.42 [0.42] 0.40 [0.37] 0.683 [0.674]
Age 1.72 [1.77] 1.90 [1.94] 0.170 [0.192]
Graduate 0.22 [0.21] 0.25 [0.29] 0.405 [0.437]
Economics 0.51 [0.53] 0.60 [0.69] 0.259 [0.179]
Table 1. Average charity-specic, altruistic, and personal features, disentangled by chosen charity.
Note : For each average and test, the rst value refers to the whole sample of 100 subjects. The second
value, in square brackets, refers to the sub-sample of 78 rational-KMM-coherent subjects.
Table 1 shows that the fraction of subjects who participated in the activities of the
chosen charity is signicantly higher among those who chose a national or local rather
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than an international charity. Furthermore, around 1/3 subjects choosing national or lo-
cal charities had relatives or friends directly concerned by these charities; this fraction is
signicantly lower (less than 1/2) across subjects choosing international charities. Both
these di¤erences seem reasonable. In fact, in real-life bequest decisions, international char-
ities are more often chosen for reputation or loyalty reasons (in Table 1, the number of
years a subject knew the chosen charity is higher, although not signicantly, for inter-
national charities). National or local charities are instead chosen more often because of
personal involvement and/or because a friend or relative is involved in or concerned by
their activity. Table 1 also shows a higher (although, again, non-signicantly) average
number of previous donation to national or local charities than to international ones. In
the last part of Section 4.4, we will use the fact that a subject has chosen a national or
local rather than an international charity as a feature of higher warm-glow altruism toward
that charity for the same voluntary donation selected in period 2 of phase B.
Finally, Table 1 shows no signicant di¤erence across the two categories of charities for
all variables measuring subjectsgeneral perception of altruism or idiosyncratic features.
We interpret this result as further conrmation of the adequacy of our charity selection
procedure, and elicitation of warm-glow motivations for charitable donations interpreted
as bequest to a next generation in phase B.
4.4 Test of behavioral hypotheses
In this section, relying on the categorization of Sections 4.14.3, we test the three behav-
ioral hypotheses elaborated in Section 3.2 about subjectsbehavior in the annuity-bequest
decision problem of phase B.
Figure 6 reports in the left panel the distribution of subjectsdemand for annuities
(invested amount in period 1) of rational-KMM-coherent subjects. All subjects demanded
a positive amount of annuities, with 27% of them (21/78) investing half of their endowment
and 19% of them (15/78) investing all their endowment (average investment = 57.4%).
Figure 6. Frequency of invested amounts (left panel), and average invested amount by ambiguity
attitude (right panel).
In the right panel, Figure 6 reports the average demand for annuities disentangled
by the sign of the ambiguity attitude (aversion, neutrality, proneness) for rational-KMM-
coherent subjects. A signicantly di¤erent demand for annuities is found for the three
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categories of ambiguity attitudes, independent of whether we consider value-ambiguity,
choice-ambiguity, or coherent-ambiguity attitudes (Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value = 0.000,
0.060, and 0.001, respectively). Pairwise comparisons conrm a signicantly lower demand
for annuities by value-ambiguity-averse than by value-ambiguity-neutral subjects (Mann-
Whitney test, p-value = 0.002). They also conrm a signicantly higher demand for
annuities by choice-ambiguity-loving than by choice-ambiguity-neutral subjects (Mann-
Whitney test, p-value = 0.093). Finally, a signicantly lower demand for annuities is found
among ambiguity-averse than among ambiguity-loving subjects, independently from the
dimension of ambiguity attitude (Mann-Whitney test, p-value = 0.000 for value-ambiguity,
0.018 for choice-ambiguity, and 0.000 for coherent-ambiguity).
To provide econometric support to the results shown in Figure 6, we run three regres-
sions with the invested amount a in period 1 of phase B as dependent variable. Since
a 2 f0; 1; :::; 9; 10g, we rely on Tobit models, left censored at 0, and right censored at
10.14 In each of the three models, the main regressor is a dummy for subjects coherent-
ambiguity aversion. Model I considers as regressors also the charity-related items (Charity
Relatives-Friends dummy not included since correlated to Charity Participation dummy)
and the subjects general perception of own altruism (general perception of othersaltru-
ism not included since correlated with the former). Model II includes instead controls for
individual characteristics (Graduate dummy not included since it correlates with age), and
for treatment e¤ects (due to the di¤erent order of presentation of the four tasks of phase
A). Model III considers together all the above mentioned regressors. Results of these three
regressions are shown in Table 2.
Dep. var.: Invested amount Model I Model II Model III
Coherent-Ambiguity Aversion 2.45 *** (0.67) 2.27 *** (0.67) 2.30 *** (0.68)
Charity Know Years 0.13 (0.23)  0.12 (0.25)
Charity No. Previous Donations 0.04 (0.27)  0.05 (0.27)
Charity Participation 0.05 (0.79)  0.29 (0.84)
Altruism Own 0.11 (0.17)  0.04 (0.17)
Female  0.31 (0.66) 0.23 (0.73)
Age  0.73 (0.51) 0.79 (0.56)
Economics  0.06 (0.67) 0.16 (0.72)
Treatment  0.46 (0.67) 0.40 (0.69)
Constant 7.60 *** (1.26) 6.97 *** (1.75) 7.13 *** (2.19)
Log likelihood 170.30 169.01 168.73
No. of observations 78 78 78
Table 2. Tobit regressions explaining the invested amount of rational-KMM-coherent subjects in
period 1 of phase B.
Note : Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
14As Figure 6 shows, none of the rational-KMM-coherent subjects chose a = 0 and only 15/78 chose
a = 10. Therefore, we also run OLS regressions with the same three specications of Table 2, and found
similar results. As further robusteness check, we also run Tobit regressions with clustered errors at the
session level (25 subjects per experimental session). Also in this case, results are similar to those presented
in Table 2. Results of all these regressions are available upon request.
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Table 2 shows that the only regressor explaining a subjects demand for annuities in
period 1 is his/her attitude toward the ambiguous probability of being active (alive) in
period 2. In particular, ambiguity aversion elicited in phase A of the experiment signif-
icantly reduces the demand for annuities in phase B. Furthermore, the coe¢ cient of the
coherent-ambiguity aversion dummy is always signicant at the 1% level in each of the
three model specications, thus providing robustness to this result: ambiguity aversion
reduces the demand for annuities with or without controlling for the subjects warm-glow
motivations and idiosyncratic features. A similar result is obtained if considering as re-
gressor, rather than a dummy for ambiguity aversion, an ordered variable for subjects
ambiguity attitude (1 for aversion, 0 for neutrality, +1 for proneness).
Notice that, although the coe¢ cients of all charity-related measures of warm glow
have the predicted (negative) sign in Model III, none of them is signicant in either Model
I or Model III. More precisely, we have tried several other specications with charity-
related and perceived altruism variables as unique regressors (with or without controls
for individual characteristics) and found that in none of them any of their coe¢ cients is
signicant.
All this leads us to conclude that hypothesis 1 is veried.
The test of hypothesis 2 relies on the data reported in Figure 7. The gure shows
the subjects wealth allocation in period 2 if active (alive), i.e., if a ball of the winning
color is randomly selected from the urn with unknown composition of balls (representing
the subjects unknown survival probability). In particular, we highlight the share of
this wealth the subjects would voluntary give (x) to the chosen charity, disentangled by
the sign of subjectsambiguity attitude. Recalling that the total wealth if alive in period
2 is given by (10 + a), Figure 7 reports the average value of x=(10 + a) across rational-
KMM-coherent subjects with the same ambiguity attitude. The complementary share,
(10 + a   x)=(10 + a), represents the portion of total wealth if active that the subject
would keep for him/herself at the end of the experiment.
Figure 7. Voluntary donation as share of wealth if active in period 2, by ambiguity attitude.
For each dimension of ambiguity attitude (value, choice, or coherent) and each sign
(aversion, neutrality and proneness) given the dimension, the average share of total wealth
voluntary donated to the chosen charity is between 15% and 25%. Therefore, no signi-
cant di¤erence is found across di¤erent ambiguity attitudes if considering value-ambiguity
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(Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value = 0.251), choice-ambiguity (p-value = 0.492) or coherent-
ambiguity (p-value = 0.308). Pairwise comparisons of ambiguity attitudes through the
Mann-Whitney test conrms this result (lowest p-value = 0.113, found for value-ambiguity
neutral vs. loving, last two histograms of the rst triplet of Figure 7).
Therefore, we can state that hypothesis 2 is also veried: The subjectsallocation
of wealth between own consumption (experimental earnings in phase B) and voluntary
bequest to the chosen charity is independent from the subjects ambiguity attitude.
We conclude this section with the test of hypothesis 3. Figure 8 reports, in the left
panel, subjectsprivate earnings (consumption) and voluntary donation (charity bequest)
if active in period 2, for each invested amount (demand for annuities) in period 1. This
panel refers to all rational-KMM-coherent subjects. The right panel reports the same
statistics for the subgroup of such subjects who indicated a national or local charity at
the beginning of phase B.
Figure 8. Subjects earnings and voluntary donations if active in period 2, by invested amount.
Note : The left panel refers to all rational-KMM-coherent subjects (78 obs., red- and yellow-color charities
of Figure 5). The right panel only refers to the subgroup of rational-KMM-coherent subjects who chose a
national or local charity at the beginning of phase 2 (35 obs., only yellow-color charities of Figure 5).
The left panel of the Figure 8 shows a positive correlation between consumption if
alive in period 2 and demand for annuities in period 1 (Spearmans rho = 0.59, p-value =
0.000). However, the correlation between the latter and voluntary bequest in period 2 is
not signicant (Spearmans rho = 0.14, p-value = 0.216). Both positive correlations are
signicant in the right panel of Figure 8 (rho = 0.47, p-value = 0.004 for consumption, rho
= 0.31, p-value = 0.071 for bequest). This seems to suggest that for voluntary bequest to
increase with the demand for annuities, a threshold level of warm glow should be overcome.
This point deserves a more thorough discussion.
As anticipated in the previous section, here we rely on the distinction international vs.
national (and local) charities, and elaborate the operational assumption that donating to a
perceived closer charity (because of social identity, own participation, or friends/relatives
involvement) generates more warm-glow altruism.
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As it is well known in the literature of charitable giving (see, e.g., Sargeant 2008),
donors have a need to belong they need to feel that they are part of the charity. They
should not just give to the charity, they should feel as a charity sponsoror charity sup-
porter. However, it is not enough for them to feel how similar they are to the organization.
They need to experience this for themselves. That is why charities try to involve their
donors to take part in events and activities that let them experience similar beliefs and
values being applied. Data of Table 2 in the previous section (see, e.g., the two dummies
Charity Participation and Charity Relatives-Friends) show that in our sample this process
applies more easily to local and national than to international charities.
The two OLS regressions in Table 3 capture this issue, raised by the analysis of the
two panels of Figure 8. In Model I, the two explanatory variables are the amount invested
in annuities in period 1, and a dummy (National Charity) indicating that the chosen
charity at the beginning of phase B was a local or national one. The controls are the
same as in Table 2, apart from charity-related variables, that are omitted due to positive
correlation with the National Charity dummy. Model II, using the same control variables,
proposes as regressor the interaction between the demand for annuities and the National
Charity dummy. We can see that in Model I (in line with the left panel of Figure 8),
the invested amount does not signicantly boost the voluntary bequest, which instead
signicantly depends (p-value = 0.061) on the recipient being a local or national rather
than an international charity.
In Model II, the interaction term is highly signicant (since p-value = 0.017), thus
suggesting that the higher returns generated by a higher investment in annuities are used
to also increase the next generations wealth only if this generation is perceived as enough
close. Furthermore, the perception of ones own level of altruism toward a third person
(Altruism Own in Table 2) signicantly contributes to increase the voluntary bequest,
thereby conrming a higher perceived warm glow when the donation recipient is a national
rather than an international charity.
Dep. var.: Voluntary Bequest Model I Model II
Invested Amount 0.11 (0.13) 
National Charity 1.29 * (0.68) 
Invested Amount * National Charity  0.15 ** (0.06)
Altruism Own 0.26 (0.16) 0.26 * (0.16)
Female 0.61 (0.65) 0.73 (0.64)
Age 0.12 (0.52) 0.08 (0.51)
Economics 0.22 (0.67) 0.37 (0.65)
Treatment 0.15 (0.68) 0.29 (0.64)
Constant 0.56 (2.08) 0.90 (1.78)
Adj. R-squared 0.049 0.075
No. of observations 78 78
Table 3. OLS regressions explaining voluntary donation of rational-KMM-coherent subjects.
Note : Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
To summarize, we can state that hypothesis 3 is always veried for consumption:
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we nd that the latter is signicantly increasing in the demand for annuities both when
considering all the rational-KMM-coherent subjects and when disentangling them by type
of charities receiving the amount not consumed. Hypothesis 3 is veried for voluntary
bequest only for su¢ ciently high levels of warm glow giving. In our experiment,
this seems to occur for bequests toward local or national charities, but not for those
directed to internationally well-known but less participatedcharities.
5 Conclusion
Our study introduces a novel experimental design able to detect individualssmooth ambi-
guity attitudes and relate them to life self-insurance decision problems. The experimental
results support the intuition that ambiguity aversion may be a relevant motivation for the
empirically observed under-annuitization puzzle when facing investment decisions where
the (unknown) probability of being alive tomorrow is involved.
In fact, provided that annuities return is su¢ ciently larger than bonds return, and
notably when as in our experiment it is fair, the optimal share of annuities in the
portfolio should be positive. However, if the investor had a preference for known rather
than unknown survival probabilities, he/she would nd this nancial instrument not so
attractive. Thus, for a given level of uncertainty, an ambiguity-averse individual would
invest less in annuities than an ambiguity-neutral one. This would ultimately reduce,
upon survival, both his/her consumption and his/her bequest to the next generation,
given that both should be increasing in the investment in annuities. Our experimental
results conrm both these intuitions, by measuring ambiguity aversion within a KMM
framework and employing donations toward a pre-selected charity as experimental proxies
of warm-glow giving toward a related next generation.
There is a growing experimental literature on the behavioral determinants of the de-
mand for insurance (see, e.g., Corcos et al. 2017, and references therein), and on the impact
of ambiguity aversion on insurance decisions (see, e.g., Di Mauro & Ma¢ oletti 1996, and
Cabantous 2007). However, still few experimental studies have focused on annuities as an
insurance instrument.
Among relevant exceptions, the potential impact of recent stock returns on annuitiza-
tion decisions was tested in an experimental setting by Agnew et al. (2015), conrming
the impact of recent market performance and attributing it to excessive extrapolation.
Earlier experiments (Agnew et al. 2008) have focused on the e¤ects of priming and fram-
ing on the demand for annuities. Experiments were also used to investigate the impact of
changes in the structure of annuity products with predetermined default choices (Gazzale
et al. 2012) and how the decision to retire could be a¤ected by the o¤er of annuities in
the market (Fatas et al. 2007).
More recently, Hurwitz et al. (2018) has investigated the introduction and repeal
of mandatory minimum annuity laws in a laboratory experiment, and found that the
demand for annuities was sensitive to the mandatory-minimum mechanism and consistent
with anchoring to the signal reected in the requirement.
However, to the best of our knowledge, ours is the rst experimental test of the under-
annuitization puzzle employing at the same time individual (ambiguity attitude) and social
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(warm-glow giving) preferences. In this regard, the main nding of our study is that the
under-annuitization puzzle is much more related to ambiguous survival probabilities than
to a bequest motive.
The strong negative impact of ambiguity aversion on the demand for annuities detected
in our experiment should convince private rms and public authorities to reshape current
nancial instruments of self-insurance for decision makers uncertain about the probability
of being alive tomorrow. Indeed, ambiguity-averse investors might prefer nancial products
that combine an annuity and a life insurance, thereby hedging across di¤erent ambiguous
states of the world. This would challenge the standard distinction between death cover
and survival cover insurances in nancial markets. We leave to future research the
experimental test of the e¤ectiveness of these mixed instruments of self-protection against
ambiguous survival probabilities.
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